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The Opening of Japan
Eliška Lebedová
Since the first half of the 17th century Japan closed itself against the influence of the outside
world. Only the Dutch traders could under strict restrictions enter the port of Nagasaki.
This policy of so-called sakoku (isolation) was one of the cornerstones of the Tokugawa
bakufu. However, since the turn of the 18th and 19th century the ships of the western pow-
ers started to gain interest in the seas around Japan. The ruling Tokugawa regime was
nevertheless anxious of the internal consequences of the opening of the country and turned
away any effort of western Great Powers to open Japan to foreign trade. This policy was
not however backed by military ability to repulse the foreigners if they came and tried to
open Japan by force. The arrival of powerful fleet of Commodore Perry in 1853 therefore
compelled the bakufu to sign a first treaty opening its ports to western country. Treaties
with other countries followed soon and at the end of the 50s Japan had to sign a series of
unequal treaties under the pressure of the Great Powers. This was a start of a whole new
period of Japanese history.
[Japan; Great Britain; United States; Russia; France; diplomacy; international relations;
trade]
Japan1 had always been an isolated and insular country due to its remote
location. Foreign relations were limited to its relatively close neighbours
in Asia. Trade agreements concluded in the 15th century with Korea and
China led to the brisk exchange of goods, which was, however, accompa-
nied by increased activities of Japanese pirates (wako¯) and Chinese smug-
glers on the Chinese-Korean coast.2 Traders also sailed from Japan to
Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines. They sailed on ships known as
 Department of Historical Sciences, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West
Bohemia, Tylova 18, 301 25 Plzenˇ, Czech Republic. E-mail: Lebedova.Eliska@seznam.cz.
1 This study is a part of the grant project SGS–2015–014 “Velká Británie, Francie a Japonsko
ve druhé polovineˇ 19. století” on which the author participates at the Department of
Historical Sciences, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia.
2 E.O. REISCHAUER – A.M. CRAIG, Deˇjiny Japonska, Praha 2009, pp. 67–68.
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red-seal ships (go shuinsen) by authority of the shogun himself,3 which
was the only option for undertaking legal foreign trade.4
But Asian countries were not the only ones to express interest in Japan.
The Portuguese were the first to turn up on Japan’s islands, and they
were quick to establish trading relations with Japan.5 The Portuguese
were accompanied on their travels by Jesuits, who soon expanded their
missionary work in Japan under the leadership of Francis Xavier (1506–
1552). The Jesuit priests made a big impression in far-off Japan, as can be
seen in this early description of one of them: “Although man-shaped, the
Padre is undistinguishable from demons and monsters. The nose is so big it looks
like a smoothened conch shell glued to the centre of the face. The big eyes are
like a pair of lenses, with yellow irises. The head is small, the nails of the fingers
and toes long, the height in excess of seven feet, the teeth greater than those of
horses, the colour of the hair grey. He shaves the top of his head so that the scalp
is exposed as much as could be covered by a small cup. His words are like nothing
one has ever heard, and his voice resembles an owl’s hooting. Everyone says his
appearance was stranger than that of a mountain spirit.”6
Although Japanese society was strongly Buddhist and viewed foreign-
ers with a certain amount of amusement and caution, some citizens began
to turn to the Christian faith. In some cases, conversions took place for
purely selfish reasons, since good contacts with the Jesuits meant more
frequent visits from the Portuguese traders and resulting greater prof-
its. An example of this would be the construction of Nagasaki port on
the western coast of Kyushu in 1571, which soon became a centre of Por-
tuguese trade, and from 1579 was de facto in the hands of the Jesuits.7 And
it was Kyushu which could ‘boast’ of the largest concentration of Jesuits
and converts, where a considerable number of lords, or daimyo converted
to the Christian faith. Besides a foreign religion, the Portuguese brought
with them much that was new (tobacco, potatoes, tomatoes, etc.), which
Japanese society welcomed. But it was the firearms which impressed the
3 Seii tai sho¯gun or the Barbarian-subduing Generalissimowas first given as a title to the lead-
ers of the campaign against the native Ainu nation, with the title subsequently received
by the highest military commander in Japan. In 1192, Minamoto no Yoritomo (1147–
1199) received the title, and the last shogun was Tokugawa Yoshinobu (1837–1913), who
was named in 1866. Ibidem, p. 46.
4 R.H. P.MASON – J.G.CAIGER, Deˇjiny Japonska, Praha 2007, pp. 202–203.
5 REISCHAUER – CRAIG, p. 76.
6 T. TOKUGAWA, The Edo Inheritance, Tokyo 2009, p. 31.
7 REISCHAUER – CRAIG, p. 76.
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most, the so-called arquebuses, which Japan was very soon able to inte-
grate into its war strategies.8
The unstable situation which began to express itself in Kyushu forced
the then-leader of Japan,9 Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598) to take radical
measures. In 1587, he subjugated the rebellious daimyo Shimazu and in
doing so bore witness to the destabilising impact of the Christians. He is-
sued an edict which ordered all missionaries to leave the country within
twenty days, although it did not ban trade itself with Portugal.10 The
edict was not strongly enforced, and a number of missionaries did not
leave Japan. Hideyoshi’s fears of the expansion of Christianity not just
amongst the daimyo, but also amongst ordinary peasants, were deep-
ened by a number of events. These included the arrival of Spanish Fran-
ciscans and their subsequent clashes with the Jesuits, and also mission-
aries from Nagasaki joining the colonial base in the Far East at Manila in
the Philippines, which was supported by European troops.11 In his edict,
Hideyoshi stressed the execution of twenty-six missionaries (The History
of Japan states they were nine missionaries and seventeen Japanese con-
verts). Hideyoshi’s death in autumn 1598 freed up some room for the
Christian missionaries.
Although Hideyoshi’s young son Hideyori (1593–1615) was meant to
take his father’s place in future, Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616) won the
battle for power. His status was reinforced in 1603 when he was awarded
the old title of shogun and appointed a military government known un-
der the name of bakufu.12 He was very open to foreigners and interna-
tional trade. He strived to gain important knowledge on the construc-
tion of European ships since the ships built in Japan at the time were not
capable of long voyages. Spain and Portugal, however, feared that any
8 By 1575 there was already massive and strategic use of muskets in the Battle of Na-
gashino, with Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582) and Tokugawa Ieyasu integral to success.
TOKUGAWA, p. 31.
9 Hideyoshi never became shogun; he was not from the Minamoto clan. He was, however,
awarded the name of Toyotomi (Bountiful Minister) by the imperial court. In 1585, he
became Imperial Regent (kampaku) and the following year he became Grand Minister of
State (daijo¯ daijin). M. B. JANSEN, The Making of Modern Japan, Cambridge 2000, p. 18.
10 Ibidem, p. 67.
11 TOKUGAWA, p. 12.
12 Bakufu literally means tent government. The term was taken from Chinese and denoted
the tent of the commander who led the campaign against the barbarians. REISCHAUER
– CRAIG, p. 46.
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maritime expansion by Japan would represent a threat to their colonies
(e.g., the Philippines).13 William Adams (1564–1620) provided him with
an alternative,14 not just helping with the construction of ships which
were capable of successfully sailing to Mexico, but also becoming his ad-
visor over the years. Amongst other things, he arranged trade privileges
for the Dutch, and Adams’ influence led to Britain receiving approval for
establishing a factory (trading station) in Hirado in 1613.
With the arrival of the Dutch, and then the English, in Japan, there were
expressions of antipathy between them and the Spanish and Portuguese
(encouraged by disputes between Catholics and Protestants). The Jesuits
and Franciscans tried to discredit Adams and keep good relations with
the shogun court. Ieyasu, however, was alarmed by the arrogant be-
haviour. A Spanish delegation sought to expel Dutch traders, and de-
clared that “the greatest ruler in the world is the Spanish monarch”, and that
“His Christian Majesty [Phillip II.] has the pious desire that all nations should
be taught the Holy Catholic Faith and thus be saved”, to which Ieyasu re-
fused to agree.15 The shogunate wanted to preserve international trade,
in which Portuguese ships were involved the most, but it feared the close
links between trade and missionary work. Although King of England,
James I (1566–1625), spoke of himself as the Defender of the Faith, he want-
ed above all to trade; but it was the Dutch who impressed the bakufu
the most, keeping trade and religious thinking separate, and furthermore
Maurice, Prince of Orange (1567–1625), had warned them of the mission-
aries’ stealthy expansion: “[T]he Society of Jesus, under cover of the sanctity
of religion, intends to convert the Japanese to its religion, split the excellent king-
dom of Japan, and lead the country to civil war.”16
There was a danger that the powerful daimyo could becomemore loyal
to a foreign god (that is to say to his representative on earth, the Pope)
than to the shogun himself. Aware of this, Ieyasu, and subsequently his
successors, Hidetada (1572–1632) and Iemitsu (1604–1651), began issuing
anti-Christian edicts. Foreign monks were ordered to leave Japan under
13 G. MILTON, Na dvorˇe japonského vládce, Praha 2003, p. 68.
14 William Adams was an English helmsman who reached the Japanese coast on the Dutch
ship Leifde in spring 1600. He became a valuable associate for the Shogun for his know-
ledge of the Western world. He received a number of privileges and was named a Samu-
rai. He remained in Japan until his death in 1620. JANSEN, p. 72.
15 MILTON, p. 89.
16 JANSEN, p. 74.
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penalty of being outcast, having their nose or leg cut off, castration or
death.17 Christian temples and churches were destroyed. The converted
were forced to renounce their new faith (stepping on a Christian symbol, a
fumi-ewas considered proof of this). At the same time, citizens had to reg-
ularly visit a Buddhist temple where they were watched by priests. Those
who refused to submit were often tortured and subsequently executed.
The deeds of Christians also contributed to thewidespread negative opin-
ion of them, such as when the converted daimyo Arima tried to acquire
land and property confiscated from him by Ieyasu through bribery.18 In
1614–1615, they were involved in the uprising against Tokugawa under
the command of Hideyori, and in the defence of Osaka Castle.19 With the
gradual enforcement of strict edicts, Christianity disappeared from Japan.
All books referring to foreign religions were destroyed. The Shimabara
Rebellion in 1637 can be considered the final expression of resistance.20
Along with the persecution of Christianity, foreign trade was also re-
stricted. After Ieyasu’s death, traders were plunged into uncertainty.
They had to appear before the new shogun and ask that the rights to
their factory be recognised. Hidatada forbade foreigners from trading
anywhere other than in the ports of Hirado and Nagasaki. For the oper-
ating English factory, which was restricted only to Hirado and had deteri-
orating relations with the Dutch (who had attacked them and declared a
blockade of English goods in Hirado, amongst other steps)21 it proved its
undoing. The English ended trading relations with Japan in 1623, turning
their attention fully to India. Relations with Spain were affected by their
support for missionary work and the bakufu ended mutual trading. The
Portuguese, whom the Japanese considered the main instigators in the
spreading of Christianity, were expelled from the country in 1636. They
didn’t want to give up, however, and in 1640 sent a ship from Macau to
force the bakufu to trade with them; the Japanese response was over sixty
executions and just a handful of the crew were allowed to return safely.22
17 MILTON, p. 152.
18 JANSEN, p. 76.
19 MILTON, pp. 153–158.
20 This was in land in the north of Kyushu where peasants revolted against the tyranny of
the local ruler. The number of rebels grew to thirty thousand and the bakufu had great
problems suppressing them. A large role was played here by Dutch ships which fired on
rebel positions from the sea. MASON – CAIGER, p. 204.
21 MILTON, pp. 193–200.
22 JANSEN, p. 79.
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The last to remain in Japan were the Dutch. Their initial elation that they
had managed to gain control all foreign trade in the ‘land of the rising
sun’ was instantly forgotten when they were ordered by the shogun in
1641 tomove to the artificially-built island of Dejima at Nagasaki. Dejima,
which had originally been built for the Portuguese, was surrounded by a
fence and strictly guarded. In terms of food, it was self-sufficient to a cer-
tain extent (containing a vegetable garden and a number of cows, sheep
and hens), and water, which traders had to pay for along with the annual
lease of the whole island, was supplied using bamboo pipes.23 When a
ship sailed to this artificial piece of Japan, the crew were forbidden from
having weapons, any Christian symbols or Bibles, and they were not al-
lowed to set foot in Nagasaki without special permission. Although the
Dutch were totally isolated and had no chance of better prospects, they
continued trading with Japan. For the bakufu, trade itself wasn’t partic-
ularly important, but the presence of the Dutch meant that the Japanese
had regular information on events in the world, something they didn’t
want to miss out on.24
In order for Japan to be protected from the influence of foreigners, the
Japanese were forbidden to go abroad. Those who had left the islands in
the past were not allowed to return under penalty of death. The bakufu
restricted shipbuilding to only those able to sail along the coast, and their
tonnage was reduced to 500 koku.25 This series of measures, fully under-
taken by 1639, resulted in Japan becoming an isolated and ‘closed coun-
try’, today known as the policy of sakoku.26 The Japanese themselves,
however, used the term kaikin, or ‘maritime prohibitions’ for the situa-
tion.27 The country’s isolation was not absolute, however. Nevertheless,
Europeans sooner or later lost interest in Japan, and the only foreigners
allowed to maintain limited contact were the Dutch, while the bakufu
continued in mutual trading with their closest neighbours. The most sig-
nificant trade was between the principality of Satsuma and the Ryukyu
23 Ibidem, p. 80.
24 TOKUGAWA, p. 63.
25 This is a term for a unit of volume which defines an amount of rice – 180 litres. Individ-
ual principalities were defined by their annual production, though at least 10,000 koku.
REISCHAUER – CRAIG, p. 80.
26 The Japanese did not use the actual term sakoku until the early 19th century. The term first
appeared in 1801 in a translation of a German study by geographer Engelbert Kaempfer
(1651–1716). TOKUGAWA, p. 64.
27 MASON – CRAIG, p. 205.
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Kingdom (Okinawa),28 and also China; and also between the principality
of Tsushima andKorea (involving the port of Busan); and last but not least
between the principality of Matsumae and the native nations of Ainu in
the north of the country.29
As such, Japan had closed itself off to Western countries and their
squabbling which it considered subversive and a threat to the empire’s
stability. Over the course of the two centuries during which its isolation
was maintained, the Japanese were able to shape their identity and cul-
ture. Although they were not open to new religions, they were not closed
to new knowledge. Chinese scholars and artists were invited to Japan,
and books were much in demand.30 Over time, Japan also started im-
porting European publications, most commonly in Dutch. The study of
books, however, did not trigger the technical progress which Europe was
undergoing and which should have been a strong argument for opening
up the isolated country.
Until the end of the 18th century, the bakufu succeeded in keeping the
status quo, but the turbulent global situation began to affect even Japan.
As early as 1792, a Russian ship turned up on the island of Hokkaido. A
few years later, in 1804, a Russian expedition arrived in Nagasaki with
a request from Tsar Alexander I (1801–1825) to establish trading rela-
tions under the command of Nikolai Rezanov (1764–1807), which was
politely, but emphatically, rejected by the bakufu: “our countrymen wish
to carry on no commerce with foreign lands, for we know no want of necessary
things”.31 After departing, Rezanov ordered attacks on Japanese settle-
ments in the southern Kuril Islands and Sakhalin during 1806 and 1807.
He defended this action to the Tsar as the only way “to force the Japanese to
open trade”; in response to these attacks, Captain Vasily Golovnin (1776–
1831) was held prisoner and only released after two years when St. Pe-
tersburg had officially distanced itself from the attacks.32 Under the Rus-
28 Although it was a kingdom with its own king, it also had a vassal relationship to China
and Japan, specifically to the principality of Satsuma, which considered it its vassal ter-
ritory. D. KEENE, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852–1912, New York 2002, p.
14.
29 MASON – CRAIG, pp. 205–206.
30 During the 17th–19th century, Japan was self-sufficient in raw materials and was not
dependent on foreign trade. It mostly used trade for getting books and information.
JANSEN, pp. 91–93.
31 Ibidem, pp. 260–261.
32 W.G. BEASLEY, “The Foreign Threat and the Opening of the Ports”, in: M. B. JANSEN
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sian threat, the bakufu took the Ezo (Hokkaido) area under their direct
protection and improved its defence capabilities. Under the shadow of
the Napoleonic Wars, however, Russia was forced to end its expansion to
the Pacific and this led to a slight release in tensions. At the same time,
Japan was beginning to worry about the threat coming from China and
other foreign states, and it was thought that military reforms were neces-
sary to overturn foreign dominance (e. g., Hayashi Shihei, 1738–1793, and
his book The Military Defense of a Maritime Country, or Kaikoku heidan as
the Japanese original was titled).33 The bakufu, however, were more fo-
cused on the growing tensions within the country which were the result
of economic and social changes which had also led to a deterioration in
the status of the Samurai class.34
During the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), the situation also changed
for the Dutch. First it was conquered by revolutionary France, and the
Batavian Republic was proclaimed in 1794. In 1806, Napoleon Bonaparte
(1769–1821) charged his brother Louis (1778–1846) with ruling the coun-
try and declared the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which was then part of
France until 1814, when William VI of Orange (1772–1843) was crowned
and the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was established. After a war
with the British, Netherlands also lost its colonial base in southern Africa
and Indonesia. During this period, Dutch ships did not sail and traders
located in Batavia (today’s Jakarta) used the ships of neutral countries
sailing under the Dutch flag to get supplies to Dejima (including Amer-
icans, who visited Japan in this manner a number of times).35 Britain
was not idle, and attempted to get the weakened Dutch trade in Dejima
for itself. Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781–1826), Lieutenant–Governor of
Java was almost sure of success: “[I]f we are successful in once obtaining
footing, there will be no serious difficulty in extending the exportation to many
commodities the produce of British India, for which there is no sufficient vend
in Europe.”36 In 1808, the ship Phaeton sailed to Nagasaki where it caused
chaos when its captain appropriatedmany supplies and sailed away. Fur-
ther attempts in 1813–1814 were not successful. The command station in
(ed.), The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 1989, pp.
265–266.
33 JANSEN, p. 262.
34 E.K. TIPTON,Modern Japan: A Social and Political History, Routledge 2008, pp. 15–20.
35 JANSEN, pp. 264–265.
36 BEASLEY, p. 261.
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Dejima convinced the English to sail under a Dutch flag. Java was later
handed back to the Dutch. The bakufu did not appreciate the attempt
to bypass the Japanese government and its regulations. Although Japan
now had a greater knowledge of individual nations and their languages,
Europeans continued to be difficult to differentiate between for them (in-
cluding due to their same way of dressing, in contrast to the traditional
clothing worn by the Koreans and Chinese). The attempt at deceiving the
bakufu, with sailors and traders passing themselves off as members of a
different nation, led in 1825 to the issuance of a strict order. No differen-
tiation was to be made between foreigners, and they should be deterred
from docking in Japan: “Henceforth, whenever a foreign ship is sighted ap-
proaching any point on our coast, all persons on hand should fire on and drive it
off. If the vessel heads for the open sea, you need not pursue it; allow it to escape.
If the foreigners force their way ashore, you may capture and incarcerate them,
and if their mother ship approaches, you may destroy it as circumstances dictate.
Note that Chinese, Koreans, and Ryukyu can be differentiated by physiognomy
and ship design, but Dutch ships are indistinguishable [from those of other
Westerns]. Even so, have no compunctions about firing on [the Dutch] by mis-
take; when in doubt, drive the ship away without hesitation. Never be caught off
guard.”37
Although it might appear that this was an extreme solution, it was
not unfounded. A study of foreign publications by Takahashi Kageyasu
(1785–1829), a great intellectual and linguist, showed that foreigners
didn’t allow boats into their ports without authorisation either: “[W]hen
ships from a nation with whom diplomatic relations are not maintained tries to
enter, blank rounds are fired from the nearest cannon on shore. It is customary
for those ships to leave the harbour after thus being informed that entry is not
permitted.”38 As such, the bakufu found inspiration in Western policy and
hoped that foreigners were not going to try to penetrate their territory.
Despite this tough approach to ‘barbarians’, ships did appear on the hori-
zon which were trying to land on Japanese shores. In 1838, the American
ship Morrison was sent to establish trading relations under the pretext of
saving seven shipwrecked Japanese subjects. In accordance with the 1825
edict, the ship with the shipwrecked subjects on board was driven away
from the coast.
37 JANSEN, p. 266.
38 Ibidem, pp. 266–267.
39
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
West Bohemian Historical Review VI j 2016 j 1
At the same time, there was a conflict of ideas between Japanese schol-
ars. Those supporting the isolationist policy, including Seishisai Aizawa
(1782–1863) wanted to prevent any kind of foreign trade, as it would be
damaging for the bakufu, and they considered relations with foreign-
ers to be subversive; they strived for a deepening of national units and
modernised armed forces without the assistance of Western foreigners.39
Against them were the intellectuals who warned against the military and
political strength of the West, which was unrivalled in the Far East, and
warned against constantly rejecting foreigners and urged the bafuku to
open the ports and the country itself.40 Although they always had the
good of the empire in mind and offered their knowledge of Western tech-
nologies which could improve Japan’s defences, they were persecuted,
jailed and sometimes even executed, or they committed seppuku ritual
suicide; e. g., Watanabe Kazan (1793–1841), Takano Choei (1804–1850).
To a certain extent, the Morrison incident created fears of the possi-
ble response of Western powers, and these were reinforced by events in
subsequent years. Japan observed with surprise and fear how the for-
merly powerful ‘Middle Kingdom’ (China) bowed to foreigners. China’s
Daoguang Emperor had tried to prevent the extensive import of opium
which had resulted in a few million subjects becoming addicted. Its dis-
pute with Britain culminated in the so-called First Opium War of 1839–
1842. This showed that China was unable to compete with the warfaring
of the ‘barbarians’. A peace treaty was signed inNanking inwhich Britain
achieved the complete opening up of China. Britain demanded the pay-
ment of war reparations and very favourable trading terms (the opening
of further ports for traders, a single customs tariff of 5 %, and the right to
extraterritoriality where British citizens were judged in accordance with
British law within Chinese territory),41 these being ignominious and dev-
astating for China. Over time, as Japan received information about this,
it became clear what risk they were facing. But they were still unable to
understand what the brave Chinese warriors had done wrong, and the
Dutch gave them this answer: ‘‘Bravery alone is not sufficient, the art of war
demands something more. No outlandish power can compete with a European
one, as can be seen by the great realm of China which has been conquered by only
39 REISCHAUER – CRAIG, pp. 120–121.
40 JANSEN, pp. 267–269.
41 J. K. FAIRBANK, Deˇjiny Cˇíny, Praha 1998, pp. 232–235.
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four thousand men.”42 Mizuno Tadakuni (1794–1851), author of the Tenpo¯
Reform,43 also responded to the situation, writing: “This concerns a foreign
country, but I think it should provide a good warning for us.”44 In response to
the demonstration of the West’s military might, the bakufu relaxed their
Edict to Repel Foreign Vessels of 1825 such that if the ship and its crew
were in an emergency situation, they were permitted to rest and fill up
with necessary supplies. Foreigners were still forbidden from leaving the
ship, and if they refused to leave after regaining their strength, Japan’s
defenders were permitted to force them away. This did not really repre-
sent an act of mercy or the end of isolation, but was rather an expression
of pragmatism, which was designed to avoid war with foreign nations,
something Japan was not prepared for. Many of the daimyo, including
Tokugawa Nariaki (1800–1860), were aware they were unprepared and
urged the government to abolish the restriction on building large ships.
Their endeavours, however, were without success; the result was secretly
built ships and smuggled foreign manuals and weapons.45
At the same time, Japan received a letter from theNetherlands inwhich
KingWilliam II of the Netherlands (1792–1849) called for it to take a more
open approach to foreign trade: “We are aware that the laws laid down
by Your Majesty’s enlightened predecessors limit exchange with foreign people
severely. But, as Lao Tzu says, ‘where wisdom is enthroned, its product is the
maintenance of peace’. When ancient laws, by strict construction, threaten the
peace, wisdom directs that they be softened.”46 He feared that if Japan was
to continue its sakoku policy, it could meet a similar fate to China: “The
intercourse between the different nations of the earth is increasing with great ra-
pidity. An irresistible power is drawing them together. Through the invention
of steamships distances have become shorter. A nation preferring to remain in
isolation at this time of increasing relationships could not avoid hostility with
42 Ibidem, p. 273.
43 Tenpo¯ orHeavenly Protection is a term describing the new era beginning in 1830. Although
it was hoped to be an era of economic growth, it turned out to be more the opposite. Un-
usually harsh weather, poor harvests, unhappy samurais and peasants; all this caused
the government to attempt the implementation of extensive reforms. They were unsuc-
cessful, however, and Mizuno Tadakuni was removed from the government. TIPTON,
pp. 22–24.
44 JANSEN, p. 270.
45 TIPTON, p. 25.
46 JANSEN, pp. 273–274.
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many others.”47 Although these were convincing arguments, the bakufu
rejected them, saying it was impossible. But the threat from abroad did
not vanish. Britain, boosted by its success in the Opium War, desired a
market in Japan. In 1845, Sir John Francis Davis (1795–1890), British Su-
perintendent of Trade and Governor of Hong Kong, planned a mission
with the objective of acquiring the same privileges as in China. Because
of Japan’s fears from the Opium War, he was convinced that the bakufu
would accede to his requests: “I can scarcely imagine the possibility of its
doing otherwise than at once seeing the policy of consenting to a Treaty of Com-
merce, based in substance on the Treaty of Nanking.”48 In the end, however,
such plans were abandoned. For Britain, focusedmainly on China and In-
dia, Japan was only of secondary interest and they did not want to focus
too much on acquiring privileges there. The memory of the loss-making
Factory in Hirado two centuries earlier was still fairly fresh. The United
States of America expressed greater interest in Japan in the mid-19th cen-
tury. The British government took a simple stance on this: “Her Majesty’s
Government would be glad to see the trade with Japan open; but they think it
better to leave it to the Government of the United States to make the experiment;
and if that experiment is successful, Her Majesty’s Government can take advan-
tage of its success.”49 This is a simple example of the foreign policy of the
age. If any one country was to acquire market access in the Far East, mu-
tual agreements meant that other countries would also acquire it; this was
similar in the case of China, too.
American interest in Japan was influenced to the largest extent by a
number of factors. Whaling ships had already been sailing to Japanese
shores since 1820, supplying America with the whale oil it needed (used
until 1858 to fill oil lamps).50 Due to strict maritime bans, however, the
sailors were unable to fill up their supplies and the issue of protecting
any shipwrecked mariners was very complex, or impossible. With the
opening of the Chinese market (through 1834’s Treaty of Wangxia for the
USA)51 and the establishment of a formal authority in Oregon and Cali-
fornia, the economic potential of the Pacific was seen, something America
was determined to take advantage of (until that time it had used the same
47 BEASLEY, p. 263.
48 Ibidem, pp. 263–264.
49 Ibidem, p. 264.
50 JANSEN, p. 274.
51 Ibidem, p. 275.
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trading routes across the Indian Ocean as Britain did).52 Here, Japan was
an appropriate stop in order to refill coal for the steamships on their long
route to China.
In the summer of 1846, Commodore James Biddle (1783–1848) arrived
in Edo with an official request which was then rejected. He did not have
permission from the American government to use force, and although
he was roughly treated, he did not ask for compensation and left with
nothing.53 The American government prepared carefully for the subse-
quent attempt. Command was given to Commodore Matthew Calbraith
Perry (1794–1858; the original commander was meant to be Commodore
John H. Aulick, 1791–1873),54 who carefully studied all information about
Japan available, and requested sufficient ‘deterrent’ support. Perry’s fleet,
including theMississippi, Plymouth, Saratoga and the Susquehanna flagship,
arrived at the port of Naha on the island of Ryukyu on 26 May 1853.
Perry visited Okinawa’s capital city of Shuri (despite the Principality of
Satsuma’s protests), leased a house and concluded negotiations on mu-
tual trade; he also visited the Ogasawara Islands (Bonin Islands) where
he purchased land in order to build an office and supply station there.55
Satisfied with himself, he continued to Japan itself, where he arrived in
July 1853 at the port of Uraga.56 His ship, many times larger than any
Japanese ship with a crew numbering almost a thousand men and sixty
cannons,57 was now close to Edo. The boat earned the name kurofune,
meaning ‘black ship’ as a result of the black smoke rising from its chim-
neys and its dark hull. Perry was told to move to the port in Nagasaki,
because Uraga was not the right place to receive requests from foreign-
ers. The Commodore refused to move anywhere and demanded that his
letter from President Millard Fillmore (1800–1874) be delivered to high
government representatives. According to his orders, Commodore Perry
was first to take a friendly and respectful approach, and only should that
not work was he to take a firmer approach, although he nevertheless
52 BEASLEY, pp. 267–268.
53 JANSEN, p. 275.
54 BEASLEY, p. 269.
55 KEENE, p. 14.
56 The exact date differs in different publications. In Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World,
1852–1912 and The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 5, the date of arrival is given as 8 July,
while in The Making of Modern Japan, 2 July is given. Other publications only give the
month of July, or the year of 1853.
57 JANSEN, p. 277.
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applied a firm approach from the beginning of discussions. He thought
that since all previous missions had failed despite respect and decorum,
he had the right to take an opposing approach: “He was resolved to adopt
a course entirely contrary to that of all others who had hitherto visited Japan on
a similar errand – to demand as a right, and not as a favour, those acts of courtesy
which are due from one civilized nation to another.”58 A few times, however,
he went beyond his competencies, such as when he sent the Japanese a
firm letter and a number of white flags saying they would be necessary,
in case of war, for peace negotiations.59 The shogunate, aware of the dan-
ger of rejecting the American letter, acceded to Perry’s conditions. Hewas
received in Kurihama, near Uraga port. Shogun Tokugawa Ieyoshi (1793–
1853), however, was gravely ill and unable to attend to affairs of state and
Commodore Perry was assured that he would receive a response the fol-
lowing year.60 Perry then left Japanese waters and set out for China to
renew his supplies.
The shogunate had to decide what it was going to do next. Abe Masa-
hiro (1819–1857), who stood at the head of the ‘elders’ (people alternating
in the highest executive roles and creating a collective decision-making
body),61 called a meeting regarding the new threat. But they were unable
to make a decision, being divided into camps with opposing positions,
including Abe Masahiro. At the beginning of August, he decided upon
an unprecedented step. He sent a translation of the American requests to
all daimyo, high officials and a few ordinary citizens and also informed
the Imperial Court in Kyoto of the whole event.62 Faced with an impasse,
and aware of the inevitability of Japan’s ‘opening’, he hoped for a united
course of action. The opposite, however, was what happened. Just two
of the daimyo agreed to the American terms, defending their opinion by
citing the low morale of citizens and Japan’s imperfect defence capabil-
ities; a number proposed a temporary solution saying that the shogu-
nate should trade with America only until it was fully prepared for war;
other wanted Japan to delay future negotiations until America gave up;
a number were unable to make a decision and eleven daimyo wanted
58 BEASLEY, p. 269.
59 JANSEN, p. 277.
60 KEENE, p. 16.
61 REISCHAUER – CRAIG, p. 123.
62 JANSEN, p. 280.
44
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
E. Lebedová, The Opening of Japan
to confront the foreigners and fight.63 Daimyo from the Satsuma princi-
pality, Shimazu Nariakira’s (1809–1858) idea of possible war was based
on delaying the enemy until military preparations were complete so that
they could eliminate the threat of foreign barbarians in one swift strike.64
One of the most influential proponents of war was Tokugawa Nariaki,
daimyo from the principality of Mito and maritime defence advisor, who
believed that although rejecting foreigners would involve certain difficul-
ties, the bakufu should not submit to their demands; his main argument
was about morale and honour: “When we consider the respective advantages
and disadvantages of war and peace, we find that if we put our trust in war, the
whole country’s morale will be increased and even if we sustain an initial defeat
we will in the end expel the foreigners; while if we put our trust in peace, even
though things may seem tranquil for a time, the morale of the country will be
greatly lowered and we will come in the end to complete collapse.”65
The idea of abandoning the isolationist policy which had shaped Toku-
gawa Japan for over two centuries also had its proponents. Ii Naosuke
(1815–1860), daimyo from Hikone principality, was convinced that Japan
should return to the internationalmarket whichwould provide it with the
necessary opportunities to make preparations against foreigners: “Care-
ful consideration of conditions as they are today [. . . ] leads me to believe that
[. . . ] it is impossible in the crisis we now face to ensure the safety and tran-
quillity of our country merely by an instance on the seclusion laws as we did
in former times. [. . . ] We must construct new steamships, especially powerful
warships, and these will load with goods not needed in Japan [. . . ] these will be
called merchant vessels, but they will in fact have the secret purpose of training
a navy.”66
Kuroda Nagahiro (1811–1887), daimyo from the Fukuoka principality,
was of a similar opinion. The Americans (or Russians) should be permit-
ted to trade in one port (Nagasaki) for a limited period of five to six years,
with other nations rejected; thus Japan would avoid conflicts with Amer-
ica, which were they to grow into a war could endanger the very safety
of Edo, and if they were to be attacked by Russia the shogunate could
lose some of its northern territory.67 Good relations with America (and
63 Ibidem.
64 KEENE, p. 18.
65 JANSEN, pp. 280–281.
66 Ibidem, pp. 281–282.
67 KEENE, pp. 16–17.
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consequently Russia) would serve as a shield. Kuroda also warned of the
need for better maritime defence, and in this regard the abolishment of
the ban on building large ships; experts in this field should be invited to
Japan to monitor the construction of modernWestern-style ships, and the
Japanese should be allowed to travel overseas without sanction.68 There
was unexpected support for kaikoku policy,69 or ‘open country’ from the
Imperial Court. Chancellor Takatsukasa Masamichi (1789–1868) referred
to the fact that although the country was closed to foreigners, trade with
China, Korea and the Netherlands had been undertaken the whole time,
and as such he did not see a problem in adding other countries to this
group as long as this was governed by the prescribed rules (which ap-
plied for the Dutch).70
The old Chinese proverb “internal disorder invites external difficulties,
while external problems provoke internal unrest”,71 was to prove a partic-
ularly apt description of the situation in Japan over subsequent years.
Perry’s arrival deepened the worsening crisis in the shogunate, which
culminated in 1868 with the overthrow of the shogun and the establish-
ment of a new government headed by the emperor, beginning the new
Meiji era. As such, the period from 1853 to 1868 is called bakumatsu, mean-
ing ‘end of the shogunate’.72
Before Commodore Perry returned for the response, a Russian fleet of
four ships arrived in Japan in the summer of that year under the com-
mand of Vice-Admiral Yevfimy Vasilyevich Putyatin (1803–1884). In con-
trast to the American expedition, it submitted its request in Nagasaki, as
proof of its respect of Japanese law, where it handed over a polite letter
from the Tsar with a request that trading relations be established.73 In the
end, however, they received only a few evasive responses and a plea to
wait a few years due to the death of the last shogun. He returned in Jan-
uary 1854, but again his trading treaty was rejected.74 Nevertheless, the
bakufu were focused on establishing Tokugawa Iesada (1824–1858) in his
role, and were unable to stop pressure from foreign powers. The Ameri-
68 Ibidem, p. 17.
69 TIPTON, p. 28.
70 KEENE, p. 18.
71 TIPTON, p. 25.
72 REISCHAUER – CRAIG, p. 123.
73 KEENE, p. 20.
74 BEASLEY, p. 271.
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can fleet, boosted by additional ships, returned to Japan in 1854. Perry
had found out about the Russian mission and did not want to accept
any disadvantageous agreement under any conditions.75 Both sides met
in Kanagawa (today’s Yokahama). Although the bakufu knew that they
would likely be unable to avoid the creation of some kind of agreement,
they did not want to accede to permitting international trade: “Japan is a
small country with a large population. As such, although we are self-sufficient,
we do not produce enough to sell to foreigners. Foreign trade will deplete our
resources, and what could have lasted a century would be gone in half that time.
Foreign trade is thus without merit, merely forcing the populace to suffer, caus-
ing problems for the shogun’s government. Think of a well that was dug for one
family but is used by all the neighbors. It will dry up very quickly. If foreign
powers insist on trading with us regardless of our wish, and if the only alterna-
tive is war, then we will choose to fight. Do the Western powers believe that as
long as they are making profits, the other nations’ suffering do not matter?”76
Negotiations ended on 31 March 1854, when the Japan-US Treaty ‘of
Peace and Amity’ was signed. In this, Japan consented to the opening of
two ports (Shimoda and Hakodate),77 where American ships were to get
coal, water and other supplies. Assistancewas to be given to shipwrecked
sailors, who were to be allowed to return to their countries. An American
consulate was approved, to be based in Shimoda. The treaty also per-
mitted the purchase of goods in open ports, something Perry perceived
as a precursor to future trade. It also included a most favoured nation
status for America (if Japan provided any privileges to another country,
these would automatically also apply for America too). Although the
shogun was convinced he had secured the minimum possible concession
to the foreigners, he did so without the approval of the Imperial Court
(although he had promised AbeMasahiro no action would be taken with-
out his approval).78 Emperor Ko¯mei (1831–1867) was dissatisfiedwith the
government’s approach and called for the foreigners to be expelled from
the country. The Shogun’s inability to end the threat of foreign expan-
sion and increasing dissatisfaction with the Tokugawa regime led to the
75 JANSEN, p. 278.
76 TOKUGAWA, p. 133.
77 These are two isolated and insignificant ports which were to keep the foreigners far from
Edo. REISCHAUER – CRAIG, p. 123.
78 KEENE, p. 24.
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forming of an anti-Tokugawa opposition which upheld the motto sonno¯
jo¯i – “Revere the Emperor and expel the barbarians!”79
The treaty with the Americans was not the first, and nor was it the
last. British Rear Admiral Sir James Stirling (1791–1865) arrived in Japan
as part of the Crimean War (1853–1856), assigned to protect British ships
and attack Putyatin; his main goal was to prevent Russian ships landing
in Japanese ports.80 The whole situation, however, was misinterpreted by
Japan, who offered Stirling a convention (based on Perry’s treaty), which
he accepted on 14 October 1854 even though he did not have diplomatic
credentials for this.81 Putyatin arrived in Japan at the end of that year,
whenmutual negotiations were disrupted by a large earthquake and sub-
sequent tsunami. Although a number of Russian ships, including the Di-
ana flagship were destroyed or seriously damaged, Russian sailors saved
dozens of citizens who had been swept out to sea, earning gratitude and
appreciation from the Japanese, expressed in friendlier negotiations at the
beginning of the subsequent year.82 In February 1855, a treaty was signed
in which the two countries split the Kuril Islands between themselves,
and Nagasaki port was opened. The Dutch, represented by Jan Hendrik
Donker Curtius (1813–1879) achieved a certain relaxation in conditions at
Dejima at the beginning of 1856 and also acquired the same privileges as
the other countries.
With the outbreak of the Second OpiumWar in China (1856–1860) and
the subsequent capture of Canton in winter 1857 by the allied forces of
Britain and France, the shogunate was faced with a difficult decision. The
Dutch again warned Japan that Britain would demand the same trading
rights they had in China, and as such it would be better for the empire
if they could conclude a treaty with the Netherlands first, which would
be binding for Britain. Negotiations began in Nagasaki in summer 1857,
where Curtius persuaded the officials to conclude a trading treaty which
was sent to Edo for approval. Putyatin arrived in Nagasaki in September,
and immediately demanded the conclusion of a similar treaty. The town
officials, who had still not received a decision from Edo, concluded mu-
tual treaties with the Netherlands and Russia on 16 October (involving
79 Ibidem, p. 34.
80 BEASLEY, pp. 270–271.
81 Ibidem, p. 271.
82 KEENE, pp. 25–27.
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an improvement in trading restrictions in Nagasaki).83 American consul,
Townsend Harris (1804–1878), who arrived in Japan in summer 1856, was
dissatisfied with these developments and endeavoured to acquire better
conditions for the United States of America. He demanded to appear
before the shogun with his requests; and he was granted an audience
despite many protests in the Hall of State Ceremonies on 7 December
1857.84 He received the shogun’s consent to further negotiations which
was reinforced by warnings such as Japan received from the Dutch: “If
Japan should make a treaty with the ambassador of the United States, who has
come unattended by military force, her honor will not be impaired. There will be
great difference between a treaty made with a single individual, unattended, and
one made with a person who should bring fifty men-of-war to these shores.”85
He emphatically warned the Japanese government that should a mili-
tary conflict with Britain (France) break out, they would have no chance
of winning and the empire would be at the mercy of their exaggerated
claims, while the United States was striving for an agreement in a peace-
ful manner through which Japan could prevent opium imports (in their
agreement with China, the Americans had undertaken not to import or
smuggle opium).86
Debates on the form of the treaty started at the beginning of 1858 (how
many ports would be open, whether traders would be able to live in the
particular cities, whether the presence of foreign envoys in Edo was nec-
essary). At the end of February, a draft treaty was ready which was ap-
proved by the government’s high-ranking Elder, Hotta Masayoshi (1810–
1864). Harris, however, did not realise the treaty was meant to be ratified
by the Emperor himself who had a negative attitude to co-operation with
foreigners. On the basis of his decision, Hotta was removed from his role
and replaced by Ii Naosuke (1814–1860), who influenced by events (sig-
nature of the Convention between Britain and China, the so-called Treaty
of Tientsin)87 and the insistence of American consul Harris, did not fol-
low the Emperor’s express wish not to establish trading relations with the
‘barbarians’. The treaty between the United States of America and Japan
(the ‘Harris Treaty’) was concluded on 29 July 1858 on the battleship
83 BEASLEY, pp. 276–277.
84 KEENE, p. 35.
85 BEASLEY, p. 278.
86 TOKUGAWA, pp. 132–133.
87 FAIRBANK, p. 232.
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Powhatan.88 The shogunate undertook to open a number of additional
ports over a five-year period (in addition to the ports of Shimoda and
Hakodate): Kanagawa and Nagasaki from 4 July 1859, Niigata from 1
January 1860, Hyo¯go (Kobe) from 1 January 1863; and trading in Edo and
Osaka was to be permitted from 1 January 1862.89 A consul was to reside
in each of the open cities, and a diplomatic representative in Edo. All
US citizens were to acquire extraterritoriality with judicial power repre-
sented by the consul. The treaty established a low import duty, and the
import of opium was banned except for medical purposes. The bakufu
then concluded a new treaty with the Netherlands (18 August), Russia
(19 August), Britain (26 August) and France (9 October), which as well
as the terms above included the granting of most favoured nation status
(such that all advantages which had been or would be provided to an-
other party would automatically be conferred to them).90 These treaties
are termed Unequal Treaties because one of the parties was at a disadvan-
tage (here Japan). These treaties continued to be revised until the end of
the 19th century.
With the opening of the ports, Japan found itself facing new prob-
lems. The market was dominated by quickly growing imports of cheap
manufactured products and textiles which the shogunate could not fight
against (were it to attempt to restrict foreign trade in any way, it would
come up against complaints from consuls); their low prices meant local
producers could not compete.91 An accompanying effect was the arrival
of foreign traders and diplomats to different cities. Mutual co-existence
proved problematic in many cases with the growth in internal political
tensions within the empire. Japanese authorities attempted to restrict
its citizens’ contact with foreigners by establishing separated neighbour-
hoods: “It is the desire of the Japanese authorities that all foreigners should
remove to the new location as soon as possible.”92 This attempt was compli-
cated by the fact that a number of traders had already leased houses or
land to build on and did not want to move. Such behaviour, however,
also involved taking a risk, as proven by a Mr. Porter, representative for
88 KEENE, p. 38.
89 BEASLEY, p. 280.
90 Ibidem, p. 283.
91 TIPTON, p. 31.
92 ConsulMorrison toMr. Alcock, Nagasaki, May 31, 1861, TheNational Archives, London,
Kew (henceforth only TNA), FO 410/2.
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Messrs. Dent. and Co., when his leased house was burnt to the ground in
1860.93 In trying to secure redress, he came up against the unwillingness
of the Japanese officials, which just increased tensions between them and
the consuls.
Attempts on the lives of foreign citizens by supporters of jo¯i caused
great diplomatic problems for the bakufu. In 1859 a Russian officer and
his men were attacked in the streets of Kanagawa, as a result of which the
officer died.94 In January 1861, Henry C. J. Heusken (1832–1861), an inter-
preter and secretary for American consul, Harris, was killed in Edo.95 In
the same year, an attack took place on a Russian doctor who was return-
ing home on a horse when he was attacked by a man with two swords
(only high-rank Samurais were entitled to bear two swords).96 A possible
motive for the attack could be an insult the Russian doctor may have in-
advertently committed – the right to travel on a horse was a privilege of
high-rank Samurais. Not even the fact that it was an employee of the
government eased the situation (similarly to Mr. Porter’s case), which
aroused doubts on the Japanese government’s motivation: “Is the Gov-
ernment trying to create an ill-feeling among foreigners against the Japanese, or
vice versa?”97
With the assistance of city representatives, individual consuls at-
tempted to create suitable conditions for the cohabitation of both par-
ties. Japan’s treatment of those arrested caused great controversy, as they
were not treated in accordance with the rights and liberties foreigners
were guaranteed in the signed treaties: “To seize a foreigner upon any idle
or frivolous grounds, rush upon him, drag him down, beat him and tie him with
cords in a brutal and humiliating manner, and so parade him before a Japanese
population, and his own countryman, could not possibly tend to improve the po-
sition of foreigners generally in Japan, nor be considered consistent with their
just rights. Yet such has been done on more than one occasion, without adequate
provocation or any necessity to justify either the act or the undue violence of the
method adopted.”98 In this and other cases, the foreign consuls linked up
to agree on a joint course of action (such as when the British and French
93 Acting Consul Eusden to Mr. Alcock, Hakodaki, April 12, 1861, TNA, FO 410/2.
94 Mr. Alcock to Earl Russell, Yeddo, September 21, 1861, TNA, FO 410/2.
95 BEASLEY, p. 288.
96 Acting Consul Eusden to Mr. Alcock, Hakodaki, April 13, 1861, TNA, FO 410/2.
97 Ibidem.
98 Mr. Alcock to Mr. Harris, Yokohama, December 11, 1861, TNA, FO 410/2.
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consuls left Edo following Heusken’s death until their safety could be as-
sured).99
The most significant attack was that on the British legation and its
members (including Sir Rutheford Alcock, 1809–1897, who was Britain’s
representative in Japan from 1858) in Edo on the night of 5 July 1861. Al-
though the attack was undertaken in an organised and thorough manner:
“And thus it happened that entrance was actually effected from three different
sides; partly, no doubt, with a view of distracting the attention of those on the de-
fensive, and also the more surely and rapidly to effect their object of destruction
to all in the Legation,” only a few members of the legation were injured
(including a Mr. Morrison and Mr. Oliphant).100 As compensation for
their injuries, which were shown to be lifelong for Oliphant (his left hand
was permanently damaged), they received a sum of 10,000 dollars.101
Daimyo’s and shogun’s retainers assisted in protection of the British lega-
tion. Two of thosemen died and fifteenwere injured (including a chef and
priest).102 Sir Alcock then asked the captain of the Ringdove ship to return
to the proximity of Edo and provide a number of sailors to protect the
legation.103 There had been around fourteen attackers, although this fig-
ure appeared small to Sir Alcock compared to the number supplied by the
servants which came to fifty (supported by a sheet of paper found with
one of the attackers which contained 40 names).104 Of the original four-
teen, three died during the attack, two committed seppukuwhile escaping
and three were executed (with their execution taking place in secret and
their heads displayed on poles with a description of their offence: “the
criminals whose heads were thus exposed were simply highway robbers, executed
for entering a temple and stealing”; the government explained the false ac-
cusation through fears of possible revenge from their kind).105 The attack
on the site of the British legation stirred up debate on insufficient levels
of protection of foreign citizens and their representatives. Dutch consul
de Wit refused to return to Edo until he and the other consuls were pro-
99 BEASLEY, pp. 288–289.
100Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell, Yeddo, July 6, 1861, TNA, FO 410/4.
101Minutes of a Conference with the Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs, March 12, 1862,
TNA, FO 410/2.
102Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell, Yeddo, July 25, 1861, Inclosure 6: List of Killed and
Wounded in the Attack on the Legation on the night of the 5th July, TNA, FO 410/4.
103Mr. Alcock to Captain Craigie, Yeddo, July 6, 1861, 2 AM, TNA, FO 410/4.
104Mr. Alcock to Lord J. Russell, Yeddo, July 6, 1861, TNA, FO 410/4.
105Mr. Alcock to Earl Russell, Yokohama, February 11, 1862, TNA, FO 410/2.
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vided with sufficient protection: “It is now apparent that the danger which,
according to the former communications of your Excellencies, hung threatening
over the heads of the Diplomatic Agents at Yeddo [Edo] actually still exits, and
also that the Japanese Government have not the power to enforce the respect of a
principle of the law of nations [. . . ].”106
But good relations with foreigners were not beneficial for the Japanese
either, as shown by the attack on the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Ando
Tsushima noKami (1819–1871) was attacked in 1862 during the Sakashita-
mon incident.107 Ando suffered two serious slash wounds which left him
unable to work for a whole month, and his assistant was shot; of the eight
assailants, only one survived and he declared that four of them had been
involved in the attack on the British legation a year earlier.108
The situation became even tenser when there was an attack on four
British citizens on 14 September 1862. Literally a day before this hap-
pened (13 September), Colonel Edward St. John Neale (1812–1866) had
been warned of the planned return of the imperial envoy: “[N]ot knowing
the ways and customs of foreigners, we fear some misunderstanding might arise,
and therefore we request you to make know to your Consul at Kanagawa, that we
do not wish British subjects to pass along the road the said Envoy will take on
the said 22nd and 23rd.”109 That which the Japanese ministers feared, how-
ever, actually happened the following day. The foreigners attacked were
Mrs. Borrodaile (the wife of a trader from Hong Kong), Mr. Marshall
(her brother-in-law and a trade from Yokohama), Mr. W.C. Clarke (from
the company Messrs. H. Heard and Co.) and Mr. C. L. Richardson (who
was visiting Japan before returning fromChina to England).110 The attack
took place at the village of Namamugi when they came across a proces-
sion of Samurais accompanying the father (Shimazu Saburo, 1817–1887)
of a prince of Satsuma (Shimazu Tadayoshi, 1840–1897). Mr. Richardson’s
106M. deWit to the JapaneseMinisters for Foreign Affairs, Consulate-General of the Nether-
lands in the Japan, Yokohama, July 9, 1861, TNA, FO 410/4.
107H.D. HAROOTUNIAN, “Late Tokugawa culture and thought”, in: M. B. JANSEN, The
Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 1989, p. 196.
108Minutes of a Conference with the Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs, March 12, 1862,
TNA, FO 410/2.
109 The Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs to Lieutenant-Colonel Neale, September 13,
1862, TNA, FO 410/6.
110 Lieutenant-Colonel Neale to Earl Russell, Yokohama, September 21, 1862, Inclosure 3:
Minutes of a Meeting of the Merchants resident in Yokohama, held September 15, 1862,
TNA, FO 410/6.
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group was called upon to get off the road, and although according to the
statements of the survivors they did so (though they did not dismount
their horses), they were then attacked by Samurais; Richardson died of
his wounds there, the other two men were injured and found refuge at
the American consulate in Kanagawa, and the woman escaped without
injury.111 The British consulate urged the bakufu to take drastic action,
with the support of other countries. They demanded the demotion of
the daimyo (Shimazu Saburo) who had allowed the murder, the death
penalty for at least five murderers from his entourage in the presence of
British officers, and the Japanese government was to pay £100,000 as a
fine for attacking an unarmed group of British citizens.112 The govern-
ment paid the sum in May of the following year, but it was unable to
punish the perpetrators from the principality of Satsuma. Due to the de-
lays and evasive negotiations, and the inability of the bakufu to create
order, Colonel Neale decided to take action. With a squadron of seven
ships (British, French and Dutch), he set sail from Yokohama on 6 August
1863. They arrived in Kagoshima Bay on 12 August, where the British
demands were repeated (the principality of Satsuma was also to pay an
extra sum of £25,000 and bring the murderers to justice) and they were
given one day to respond.113 The response was that the attackers had es-
caped and could not be found, and that the fine could not be paid without
the shogunate’s authorisation. Colonel Neale therefore decided to seize
a number of steamships belonging to Satsuma as compensation, during
which time they were fired upon by coastal artillery. The squadron re-
turned fire, and this resulted in the destruction of a large part of the city
of Kagoshima and a number of British ships were damaged, withdraw-
ing back to Yokohama. Although there was no clear victor, the princi-
pality decided to pay the fine (using a loan from the government) and
to punish the perpetrators if they could be found (during negotiations,
however, those in question were present in Kagoshima, and as such this
was merely an empty declaration).114 It also, however, fuelled interest in
111 Lieutenant-Colonel Neale to Earl Russell, Yokohama, September 15, 1862, TNA, FO
410/6.
112Memorandum, Foreign Office, November 28, 1862, TNA, FO 410/6.
113 KEENE, p. 75.
114 BEASLEY, p. 293.
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Western technology and warfare and the principality of Satsuma ordered
a number of warships from Britain.115
The co-existence of Japanese and foreigners remained problematic in
subsequent years, and although their cultures and traditions never
mixed, it played a large part in the modernisation of Japan in both tech-
nical and political terms. Seeing the strength of the Western forces, op-
ponents of foreigners sooner or later realised that without progress they
could never be equals. Frustration at the presence of foreign traders,
diplomats and citizens rebounded and hit the very heart of Japan, result-
ing in 1868 in the undoing of the over-two-hundred-year-old shogunate,
which had to give in to demands for reform. The Emperor once again
became the sovereign ruler. As such, the subsequent years are known as
the Meiji Restoration, which led to the formation of modern Japan as we
know it today.
115 REISCHAUER – CRAIG, p. 133.
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